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Individual Safety Protests in the
Nonunion Workplace: Hazardous
Decisions Under Hazardous Conditions
I. Introduction
On January 5, 1959, seven nonunion workers at the Washington
Aluminum Company's Baltimore plant mutually decided to walk off
their jobs rather than continue working under sub-freezing condi-
tions. The leader of this group would later testify that just prior to
leaving he turned to his fellow workers and said, "'Well Dave Jarvis
[the foreman] told me if we had any guts we would go home'" and
"I am going home, it is too damned cold to work."1 The words and
actions of these seven employees were to spark one of the most
heated debates in the modern history of labor law in the United
States concerning the right of an employee to refuse to do hazardous
work in the face of certain retaliatory' action by the employer.
While the concept of worker self-help with regard to working condi-
tions is not new,8 before the Washington Aluminum stand-off, the
exhibition of the ultimate form of self-help - an employee's out-
right refusal to continue working in an unsafe environment - was a
phenomenon addressed by neither the courts nor the government
agencies designated to execute federal labor policies.
The controversy at Washington Aluminum ultimately led to the
recognition of a right of unionized workers4 and nonunionized work-
1. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 11 (1962).
2. The term "retaliatory" action encompasses a wide range of employer responses to
hostile employee activity, most commonly in the form of a discharge, although retaliatory ac-
tion may include citations upon employment records, loss of seniority or any other alteration in
the terms or conditions of employment, see infra note 16. See generally Gregory, Unprotected
Activity and the NLRA, 39 VA. L. REv. 421 (1953).
3. Brown, A Law is Made - The Legislative Process in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 25 LAB. L.J. 595 (1974). The author traces the notion of worker self-help
with respect to working conditions from the Roman scholar, Pliny the Younger, to the present
day. For a good historical sketch of employee concerted activity see Cox, The Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
4. This comment concerns itself primarily with the protection of individual employees
in a nonunionized workplace. A third protective mechanism is available to unionized workers
under §502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. §143 (1973). This protec-
tion arises when an employee refuses to do unsafe work in apparent breach of a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement. For a good discussion of §502 and its effect upon
the unionized employee, see Note, Refusals of Hazardous Work Assignments: A Proposal for
a Uniform Standard, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 544, 553-58 (1981); Comment, Constructive Con-
ers acting in concert to refuse unsafe assignments. The notion that
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)5 created an implicit
right to refuse unsafe work was later broadened by the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB)6 and the courts to include the isolated
acts of individual employees in both the unionized and nonunionized
workplace.7 During the years following the work stoppage at Wash-
ington Aluminum, the growth of this newly protected "right" of the
individual worker was mirrored in the statutory provisions of the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA)8 and particularly in the
interpretive regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor in
1973.' This steady expansion of the NLRA's dome of protection
under which even nonunion workers in a nonunion workplace came
to be covered ended abruptly with the NLRB decision in Myers In-
dustries, Inc.1" In Myers Industries, the NLRB reversed its decade-
old policy and formally rescinded protection of individual nonunion
employees' protesting on the job.
This comment traces the expansion of the protection granted an
individual employee under the NLRA from its inception in NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co." to its ultimate demise in Myers Indus-
tries. 2 It examines the role which OSHA has played in providing
statutory protection for nonunion employees facing the dilemma of
whether to risk injury or lose their jobs. Finally, it focuses on practi-
cal and theoretical ramifications of recent developments upon the
NLRA and OSHA regarding this issue.
certed Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 152 (1972).
5. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1973). Section 7 of the Act
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section [8(a)(3)].
6. 29 U.S.C. §153 (1973).
7. See infra notes 56-95 and accompanying text.
8. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (1975) (as
amended 1978). The statute states in pertinent part:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on
behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.
9. See infra note 112.
10. Myers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1984 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 116,019 (1984).
11. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
12. Myers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, (CCH) 1 16,019 (1984).
II. The Rise of NLRA Protection for Refusals to do Hazardous
Work
A. Background
The National Labor Relation Act has been referred to as the
labor movement's "Bill of Rights".'3 The Act was conceived by its
founders to provide sweeping protection for concerted employee ac-
tivity in the face of employer retaliation. The foundation for this pro-
tection lies in section 7 of the Act, which posits that "employees"
have the right "to engage in concerted activity" for their "mutual
aid or protection."" Interference with this basic right constitutes an
unfair labor practice which may be dealt with by the National Labor
Relations Board. 15
In the years immediately following the promulgation of these
protected rights, the NLRB, consistent with the mandate of section
13 of the Act," held all concerted employee activity to be protected
from employer retaliation with the rare exception of the actions of
striking employees convicted of felonies or of those involved in "in-
13. This seems to be an Americanization of a statement in the Congressional Record
which characterized the NLRA as "a Magna Carta for employees." 79 CONG. REC. 9716
(daily ed. Feb. 21, 1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). Perhaps this legislative history of the
NLRA is most clearly preserved in Section 13, which states that nothing in the Act "shall be
construed so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §163 (1973).
14. 29 U.S.C. §157.
15. The Board, upon the finding of a §8(a)(1) violation has broad remedial powers by
which it may sanction the employer. 29 U.S.C. §160 (1973). The section states, in pertinent
part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opin-
ion that any person named in the complaint was engage in or is engaging in any
such unfair labor practices, then the Board shall . . . issue and cause to be
served on such persons or order to cease and desist from such unfair labor prac-
tice, and take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter ...
The Board's determination that an unfair labor practice has occurred triggers the protections
accorded employee concerted activity under the Act. The NLRA lists five areas of unfair labor
practices committed by an employer. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(l)-(5)(1976). Section 8 provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in §157 [section 7] of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hired or tenure of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization ...
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter . ..
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees.
This Comment deals with employer activity that falls within the first category of unfair labor
practices, commonly referred to as §8(a)(l) violations. This activity is derived from rights
created under §7 of the NLRA, see supra note 5.
16. See supra note 13.
defensible" activities. 17 However, in 1939, the Supreme Court began
the process of limiting the scope of concerted activities protected
under section 7.18 In NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co.,19 the
Court noted that certain types of concerted activity constitute unlaw-
ful conduct and therefore should be removed from the protective am-
bit of the NLRA. Noting that the purpose of the Act was to develop
binding contracts through collective bargaining, the Court concluded
that employee activity in contravention of this or other NLRA policy
could no longer be shielded from employer retaliation.2 0 This analy-
sis departed from the concept of protected concerted activity adopted
immediately following the enactment of the NLRA. Suddenly, the
standard of protection had shifted from the minimal requirement
that concerted activity not be felonious or "indefensible", to a more
imposing requirement that concerted activity not be inconsistent
with the purposes of the Act. The withdrawal from the blanket safe-
guards envisaged by the early commentators allowed both the courts
and the NLRB broad powers to limit enforcement of the protective
features of the Act to the confines of discernible Congressional in-
tent."' Thus, the concept of concerted activity remained protected
only to the extent that such protection would not threaten the deli-
cate balance between employee and employer rights established in
the Act itself.
22
17. In re Standard Lime and Stone Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 106, vacated on other grounds, 97
F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1938) (felony conviction); Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686
(1938) (indefensible activities). See also In re Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 5
N.L.R.B. 959 (1938) (sit-down strike); In re Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 181 (1936) (breach of contract), Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 4 N.L.R.B. 604 (1937)
(threats of violence).
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). The em-
ployees at Fansteel, in a labor dispute with their employer, seized two 'key' buildings at the
employer's facility forcing the cessation of operations at the plant. The Court found that the
employees had taken "a position outside the protection of the statute and [had] accepted the
risk of the termination of their employment upon grounds aside from the exercise of the legal
rights which the statute was designed to conserve." Id. at 256-57. See also Southern Steam-
ship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (employees activity was found violative of a federal
mutiny statute and therefore unprotected). See generally Hart and Pritchard, The Fansteel
Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 52 HARv. L. REV. 1275 (1939), which analyzed the impact of these cases upon NLRA
protection.
19. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
20. Id. at 342.
21. See Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240, 255-56 (1939) in which the Supreme Court stated:
We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain
persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct - to invest those
who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or vio-
lence against the employer's property, which they would not have enjoyed had
they remained at work. . . . Congress also recognized the right to strike . . .
[b]ut this recognition of the "right to strike" plainly contemplates a lawful
strike.
22. See NLRB v. Western Cartridge Co., 139 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1943) (wildcat strike
is unprotected because employees are acting as individuals, not as members of a labor organi-
zation); NLRB v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942) (procedure of
This shift created an "extralegality";23 a zone of activity which
though not illegal or indefensible, was beyond the protective reach of
the Act. Thus, the "extralegality" of concerted activity generated
numerous exceptions to the employee activity theoretically protected
under section 7 of the NLRA. One such exception was activity
which obstructs the employer's right to manage."' A series of cases
following the Supreme Court's decision in Sands,25 demonstrate an
attempt by the NLRB and the courts to distinguish concerted activ-
ity concerning a purely managerial decision, from protected activities
generated by a legitimate labor dispute.26 This fundamental distinc-
tion actually was rooted in the legislative history of the NLRA. Dur-
ing the legislative debate opponents portrayed the Act2 7 as a usurpa-
tion of an employer's managerial discretion to discharge an employee
for insubordination.28 Their concern was manifested in the insulation
of certain management decisions from section 7 of the Act via a pub-
lic policy exception. The safety concerns voiced by the Washington
Aluminum employees should be viewed upon this backdrop of con-
troversy regarding what actually constitutes a purely managerial
decision.
the NLRA is not a private one to enforce a private right); NLRB v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 119
F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1941) (membership in a union is not a guarantee against discharge); Hum-
ble Oil & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1940) (NLRA does not authorize the
Board to substitute its judgment for that of the employer as to what is sufficient cause for
discharge).
23. This term was originally coined in Note, Availability of NLRA Remedies to "Un-
lawful" Strikers, 29 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1945).
24. Reeder, Unprotected Activity Under the National Labor Relations Act, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 358, 360-68 (1953). The author catalogs unprotected activity into four distinct areas: (1)
activity constituting a breach of a collective bargaining agreement; (2) activity which under-
mines the collective bargaining process; (3) activity obstructive of the right to manage; (4)
activity in violation of a statute.
25. See supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
26. See Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1947)
(employee may be discharged for refusing to obey management directive concerning the con-
duct of business); In re Aurora Wall Paper Mill, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B. 188 (1947) (refusal to
accept work assignment is unprotected); NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1947) (employee walk-out to protest change of foreman is unprotected as change is man-
agement prerogative).
27. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 199, 201-14 (1960). The author notes that the Wagner Act was opposed by organized
industry with a "force and fervor and expenditure of funds unparalleled." Furthermore, the
Act was "vehemently opposed by almost all of the press," as well as from "high ranking mem-
bers of the Roosevelt Administration." Id. at 200.
28. 79 CONG. Rac. 7565 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). The
terms of the debate concerning the right of management ultimately to determine the terms of
employment were dramatically outlined by Senator Wagner when he introduced the bill. He
stated:
In this modern aspect of a time-worn problem the isolated worker is a plaything
of fate. Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size
of corporate enterprise, he can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation
with others of his group.
B. Case Development of Protection for Individual Safety Disputes
1. Nonunionized Employees Acting in Concert: Washington Alu-
minum - The actions taken by the employees of Washington Alu-
minum forced the NLRB and ultimately the United States Supreme
Court to determine whether health and safety in the workplace was
a concern wholly within the control of management or one which
was subject to a legitimate labor dispute. The development of safe
working conditions was not a novel concept by the time this issue
confronted the Supreme Court. In 1936, the Walsh-Healy Act2 9 es-
tablished certain safety standards for federal contractors. Shortly
thereafter the Mine Safety Act ° permitted safety inspections of
mines and, in 1958, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Acts1
was amended to require employers to maintain safe condition for
their workers. 2 While these federal statutes placed an affirmative
duty upon the employer to provide safe working environments for
certain occupations, they did not speak to the rights of employees to
seek safety improvements through concerted activity. That issue was
finally resolved by the Supreme Court in Washington Aluminum.
The employer in Washington Aluminum responded swiftly to
the work stoppage at the Washington Aluminum plant; it summarily
fired all seven employees upon notification of the walk out.33 Because
these workers were not represented by a union, or under a collective
bargaining agreement, they could not appeal the termination
through arbitration or grievance procedure. The employees therefore
appealed to the NLRB under section 7 for protection of what they
deemed "concerted activity for mutual aid or protection."3' Though
the precise definition of what constitutes "concerted" activity had
been the subject of great debate since its inception," it was not an
issue in this case because the simultaneous action taken by these
seven men clearly was "concerted". Rather, the focus of Washington
Aluminum centered on whether this kind of work stoppage was "un-
29. The Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1965). The Act regulated federal con-
tracts in excess of $10,000 prohibiting "working conditions which are unsanitary or hazardous
or dangerous to the health and safety of employees." Id. at §35(e).
30. These provisions were uniformly codified in the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§721-740 (1971) (repealed 1977), reenacted in 30 U.S.C. §§801-962
(Supp. 1972-83).
31. Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§901-950
(1978).
32. For a good discussion of the federal government's intervention into the area of em-
ployee health and safety prior to OSHA see Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee
Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647, 652-58 (1975) and Moran, A Critique of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 200 (1972).
33. Washington Aluminum Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1960), rev'd, 291 F.2d 869 (4th
Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
34. 29 U.S.C. §157.
35. Cox, Concerted Activities, supra note 3, at 322-25.
lawful conduct""0 within the terms of the NLRA. This issue allowed
the Supreme Court, for the first time, to define a safety-related re-
fusal to work in terms of the growing schism between aspects of em-
ployment subject to managerial discretion and those subject to legiti-
mate labor dispute. The Court's placement of this type of labor-
management conflict into either category would conclusively define
its unprotected or protected status.
The battle lines for this debate had already been drawn in pre-
vious decisions by the NLRB 7 and Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.88 The Board found the issue of managerial discretion "of no
moment."3 9 Broadly construing section 7, the Board concluded that a
concerted refusal to perform services in protest of unsafe working
conditions was actively protected by the Act.4 The Fourth Circuit,
characterizing safety as primarily a management consideration,41
concluded that employees' concerns for their safety would have to be
voiced to the employer prior to the use of more extreme self-help
measures.42 Under this view, a worker could only resort to self-help
after an employer had failed to heed safety-related complaints of his
workers and thus precipitated a legitimate labor dispute."
The Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis" and
placed the safety-related work stoppage wholly within section 7 pro-
tection.' 5 The Court articulated three propositions which were to be-
36. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
37. Washington Aluminum, 126 N.L.R.B. at 1410.
38. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961).
39. Washington Aluminum, 126 N.L.R.B. at 1417.
40. Id. at 1418.
41. Washington Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d at 874. The Fourth Circuit premised its re-
jection of the Board's decision upon the employees' failure to notify their employer of the
unsafe working conditions. In the court's view the employees had not transformed the issue
from a managerial decision to a legitimate labor dispute because their actions were conditioned
upon no specific demands upon the employer. Had they demanded more heat in the plant and
had the employer not met the demand, their walk-out would have been protected. The Su-
preme Court resoundingly rejected this shifting notion of concerted activity based upon the
notification of the employer on review of the decision. See infra note 47 and accompanying
text.
42. Washington Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d at 875.
43. Id. at 877. Citing NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 465 (2d Cir.
1958), the court held:
We do not hold as a matter of law that employees engaging in concerted activi-
ties must give formal or even informal notice of their purpose. However, where
the employer from the facts in its possession would reasonably infer that the
employees in question are engaging in unprotected activity, justice and equity
require that the employees, if they choose to remain silent, bear the risk of being
discharged.
44. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
45. Id. at 18. The Court directed the Fourth Circuit to enforce the order of the NLRB
in its entirety. This constituted: an order to the Washington Aluminum Company to (I) cease
and desist from "discouraging concerted activities of its employees by discriminatorily dis-
charging any of its employees . . . and interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of. . . mutual
aid or protection" [and] (2) to award the petitioning employees "immediate and full reinstate-
come the basis for expansion of self-help protection under the
NLRA. First, the Court, applying the definition of "labor dispute"
in section 2(9) of the Act,"' found that safety concerns were a "con-
dition of employment" and as such could form the basis for a pro-
tected refusal to perform. 7 Second, it determined that the reasona-
bleness of the worker's perception with regard to his safety had no
bearing upon the issue of whether a labor dispute in fact existed. 8
Thus, the courts could not review the validity of the workplace after
the fact; the inquiry would be limited to whether the worker's per-
ception of unsafe conditions was held in good faith.49 Third, the
Court concluded, that the policy of the Act would be frustrated if
the notion of managerial control removed safety protests from sec-
tion 7 protection. 50 This conclusion reflected the Court's belief that
the right to engage in concerted activity, guaranteed under section 7,
could be effectively nullified by requiring the employees to give suffi-
cient notice to management prior to a work stoppage. 1
As of this time, neither the Board nor the courts had confronted
the issue of an individual employee's right to protest unsafe working
conditions. The employees at Washington Aluminum, though not af-
filiated with any union, sought and ultimately gained the protection
of the Act because they made their safety protest in unison. The
question still remained whether an individual employee, exhibiting
essentially the same behavior as his Washington Aluminum counter-
parts, could receive similar section 7 protection following the Su-
preme Court's decision. The very wording of section 7,52 provided
the basis for the argument against protection of singular action. The
Court defined protection in terms of "concerted action," and the leg-
islative history of the Act, which spoke to equalizing bargaining posi-
tions of management and labor through the collectivization of em-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges discharging if necessary employees hired to replace them." Wash-
ington Aluminum, 126 N.L.R.B. at 1418.
46. 29 U.S.C. §152(9) (1973). Section 2(9) of the Act provides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
47. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 15.
48. Id. at 16 n.12. The Court cited an earlier decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 334 (1938) and found "Itihe wisdom or unwisdom of the men,
their justification or lack of it, in attributing to respondent an unreasonable or arbitrary atti-
tude in connection with the negotiations, cannot determine whether, when they struck, they did
so as a consequence of or in connection with a current labor dispute."
49. Id.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 4.
ployee will in an exclusive representative."' The Act, therefore, was
not designed to protect activity generated from merely personal dis-
putes between an individual and his employer." Nevertheless, the
first expansion of Washington Aluminum to incorporate the rights of
individual employees to protest safety hazards free from employer
retaliation came four years later when the Board espoused the In-
terboro doctrine.
55
2. Unionized Employees Acting Alone: Interboro. - In In-
terboro," the Board was confronted with two individual unfair labor
practice charges in a consolidated complaint stemming from the dis-
charge of two brothers for what they termed an insistence upon "the
employer's full performance of the terms and conditions of the gov-
erning collective bargaining agreement. 657 The brothers had made a
number of complaints to the employer about faulty equipment speci-
fications, lack of protective equipment, and failure to pay adequate
wages during their employment." After their discharge and on a
hearing of the matter, the trial examiner"9 concluded that the com-
plaints had been issued solely by one brother and therefore were not
for "legitimate union or concerted aims and purposes." 60 In overrul-
ing the trial examiner, the Board could have based its decision upon
evidence indicating that two other employees had made similar com-
53. The Ideal Industrial State - As Wagner Sees It, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1947,
(Magazine) at 23. Senator Wagner described the equalizing thrust of the Wagner Act in these
terms: "Certainly the restatement and preservation of these fundamental rights is the only
basis for frank and friendly relations in industry: Peace rests upon freedom, not restraint; upon
equality, not subservience; upon cooperation, not domination." Section 1 of the NLRA links
the restoration of equal bargaining powers among employers and employees to the removal of
recognized sources of industrial unrest. 29 U.S.C. §141 (1973).
54. See, e.g., NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
55. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1298.
58. Id. at 1295-98.
59. The trial examiner is an administrative law judge (ALJ) empowered.by the Board
to adjudicate complaints of unfair labor practices. Complaints for protection under the NLRA
are first filed with an NLRB Regional Office within six months of the employer's alleged
unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. §160(b). Upon investigation of the complaint, the NLRB
General Counsel, may issue a complaint at his discretion - this decision is not reviewable by
the federal courts of jurisdiction. See infra note 134. Following issuance of the complaint, the
trial examiner conducts a hearing. At this stage and during the subsequent appellate process,
the General Counsel litigates the complaint on behalf of the petitioning employees; the NLRA
grants no private cause of action to employees. The ALJ drafts a recommended decision to
which the parties may file exceptions and petition the Board for oral argument. The Board
may either affirm or reverse the ALJ's decision, either decision being reviewable by a federal
court of appeals upon petition by the appropriate party. 29 U.S.C. §160(g). For a good discus-
sion of the mechanics of the NLRA see Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board - An
Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 819 (1968). See also Rothman, Office of the General Counsel of
the NLRB, 12 LAa. L.J. 698 (1961); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
60. Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298.
plaints.' Instead it chose to ground its finding of protected concerted
activity upon the prospective effect of an individual's complaints
upon the rights of all employees subject to the collective bargaining
agreement.62 Though made individually, the complaints "still consti-
tuted protected activity since they were made in an attempt to en-
force the provisions of the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment."6 The Second Circuit, in affirming the Board's order,
underscored the "concerted nature" of this type of individual action:
[W]hile interest on the part of fellow employees would indicate
a concerted purpose, activities involving attempts to enforce the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed
to be for concerted purposes even in the absence of such interest
by fellow employees.6"
Thus, Interboro had theoretically expanded the Washington Alumi-
num protection of section 7 over safety disputes to incorporate an
individual employee's protest over unsafe working conditions but
only within the framework of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment.6 5 Though the Board has continually reaffirmed its Interboro
decision,66 the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have rejected the In-
terboro rule, labeling it a "fiction" ' 67 and "a clear expansion of the
Acts coverage, in the face of unambiguous words in the statute.""
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Board concluded that historically, "[t]he board has held that complaints
made for such purposes are grievances within the framework of the contract that affect the
rights of all employees in the unit, and thus constitute concerted activity which is protected by
Section 7 of the Act." The Board cited three cases in support of its conclusion: (1) Bunney
Bros. Construction Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962) (employee requesting "show-up" time pay
under collective bargaining agreement); (2) N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., Nytralete Aggregate Div.,
148 N.L.R.B. 374 (1964) (employee complaints regarding job posting with reference to senior-
ity provisions of collective bargaining agreement); (3) Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 149
N.L.R.B. 1577 (1964) (employee complaints regarding inadequate safety equipment on the
job site).
64. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298. The Board remained wholly consistent with the
second proposition articulated by the Supreme Court in Washington Aluminum, which posited
that the reasonableness of the claimant grievance had no bearing upon the determination of
the existence of an unfair labor practice. Indeed, the Board cited the same passage from
NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp. See supra note 48.
66. See Myers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1984 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,019
(1984) (implicity affirming Interboro by distinguishing it on its facts from the case before it).
See also Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980); KQED, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1
(1978); Industrial Steel Stampings, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 357 (1978); King Soopers, Inc., 222
N.L.R.B. 1011 (1976); Aro Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 243 (1976); Roadway Express, Inc., 217
N.L.R.B. 278 (1975).
67. NLRB v. Adams Delivery Service, Inc., 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court,
finding that the employee had enlisted the aid of his union found no need to resort to the
"legal fiction" of Interboro. Id. at 99. Accord NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1979); Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Ben
Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971).
68. NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971). But see NLRB v.
Century Broadcasting Co., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1969) (employee acted in concert in
The split in the circuits has created uncertain consequences for
individuals protesting unsafe conditions even among those courts
which had not immediately rejected Interboro. For example, though
the Eighth Circuit did not have to reach "the close and difficult
question of whether Adams' [the petitioner's] safety campaign con-
stituted protected concerted activity," the court concluded that
"many of these [complaints] could not fall in the protected activity
category." 6' Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit found an
employee's communication to the state department of health regard-
ing unsanitary working conditions to be concerted activity only after
determining that other employees had approved the letter. 0 This
strict adherence to a group action definition of concerted activity has
greatly undermined the impact which Interboro has had in forward-
ing the rights of individual unionized employees to pursue safety re-
lated protests. The major import of the Interboro rule was, however,
that it provided the conceptual stepping-stone between the proposi-
tions articulated in Washington Aluminum and the extension of sec-
tion 7 protection to individual safety protests in the nonunion envi-
ronment. This last step finally was achieved ten years later in the
Alleluia Cushion1 decision.
3. Nonunionized Employees Acting Alone: Alleluia Cush-
ion."' - Jack Henley began working for the Alleluia Cushion Com-
pany in June 1974. Soon he began to notice numerous safety defects
at his workplace. 3 Mr. Henley voiced a series of complaints to his
employer which the employer ignored. Finally, he filed an official
complaint with the State of California Occupational Health and
Safety Administration. California OSHA informed Henley that cita-
tions had previously been issued and requested that he accompany
his reliance upon the collective bargaining agreement and therefore was engaging in concerted
activity protected under the NLRA); Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683,
685 (3d Cir. 1964) (concerted activity requires that the activity be engaged in "with the object
of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or [with] some relation to group action
in the interest of the employees"); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., 285 F.2d 8,
12 (6th Cir. 1960) ("concerted activity" need not be more than a reasonable inference . . .
that the men involved considered that they had a grievance and decided, among themselves,
that they would take it up with the management").
69. Illinois Ruan Transport Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1968). The
employee, Adams, initiated a "safety campaign" notifying his employer that the company mo-
tor vehicles were defective. Adams' concern for safety prompted him to schedule an unautho-
rized safety inspection of his equipment at an I.C.C. inspection office. One week later, Adams
was discharged for a "strictly unauthorized movement of company equipment."
70. Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
71. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
72. Id.
73. The safety defects included "the lack of instructions regarding chemicals used in
production, the absence of protective guards on machines, his inability to communicate safety
instructions to the majority of employees who were Spanish-speaking, and the absence of first-
aid stations, eyewash stations, and an overall safety program. Id. at 1001.
an OSHA inspector on a tour of the facility to identify specific
safety violations. The following day Henley was discharged. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, citing numerous cases which stood for the
proposition that "for activity to be 'concerted' there must be some
form of or relationship to group action, 74 dismissed the case be-
cause Henley had contacted no other employees in furtherance of his
safety complaints.7 5 The Acting General Counsel appealed the case
to the NLRB.
Initially the Board distinguished the facts of Alleluia Cushion
from Interboro; Interboro applied to unionized workplaces; Alleluia
Cushion Company was nonunionized.7 6 Therefore, Henley's actions,
unlike those of the complainant in Interboro, could not be construed
as an extension of the same concerted activity which had culminated
in a collective bargaining agreement.77 This distinction forced the
Board to look beyond Interboro and the literal language of the
NLRA to an analysis of external public policy considerations to de-
termine if section 7 applied. Explaining that the NLRA could not
"be administered in a vacuum, ' 8 the Board turned to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act and similar legislation at the state and
local level which indicated that safety was a concern common to all
employees and found the existence or nonexistence of a collective
bargaining agreement to be immaterial.79 Having concluded that a
safety protest intrinsically linked all employees of a nonunionized
74. Id. at 1004. The ALJ relied on the following: Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949);
B&M Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152, enforced, 368 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966); Texas
Natural Gasoline Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 405, enforcement denied, 253 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1958);
Gibbs Die Casting Aluminum Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 75 (1969). See also supra note 68 (further
listing cases supporting the group action standard for concerted activity).
75. 221 N.L.R.B. at 999.
76. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. The Interboro ruling's exclusion of
nonorganized employees could be said to have led to disparate treatment of these workers prior
to Alleluia Cushion, for the unionized employee could append his safety grievance to an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement and thus gain the protection of section 7. However, the
nonunionized worker, pursuing an identical claim against him employer could not educe such
protection. By eliminating the existence of a collective bargaining agreement as a necessary
prerequisite for concerted activity, Alleluia Cushion removed the disparity between unionized
and nonunionized employees.
77. Id. at 999 n.2. The Board concluded that, "[s]ince no collective bargaining agree-
ments exist, this case is distinguishable from cases where individual action has been found to
be concerted activity on the theory that it is merely an extension of the concerted activity
which culminated in the collective-bargaining agreement."
78. Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
79. Id. The Board relied upon the recent passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 and the legislation at the state and local level in imputing safety as a
concern of all employees. This fusion of Congressional enactment and imputed employee con-
cern was critical to the Board's expansion of the Interboro doctrine beyond the unionized
workplace. The Board, in effect, substituted the notion of imputed common concerns about
unsafe conditions with the existence of an express collective bargaining agreement concep-
tually to link an individual safety protest with protected concerted activity in the absence of
such an agreement.
workplace, it took only a short step to decide that:
[W]here an employee speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory
provisions relating to occupational safety designed for the bene-
fit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow
employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied
consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted.8"
Alleluia Cushion simply extended the original precepts of Washing-
ton Aluminum to their logical conclusion. If a safety protest could
be defined as legitimate labor dispute for a group of employees in a
nonunionized workplace then surely such a protest remains legiti-
mate when expressed by a single employee acting in a similar envi-
ronment. The same policy considerations which allowed the Wash-
ington Aluminum Court to regard safety protests as "lawful"
concerted activity - those which identified the need for employees
to raise safety issues absent fear of employer reprisals - allowed the
Board to make the conceptual leap from a "group-action"'" standard
of concerted activity to that of "implicit"82 concerted activity in Al-
leluia Cushion.
In both the Interboro8' and Alleluia Cushion8 4 decisions, the
Board remained loyal to the proposition that the employee did not
have to demonstrate the reasonableness of his perception of a safety
hazard to invoke protection under the Act. As the Board explained
in Interboro, "the right of employees to press complaints does not
depend on either the employer's or the Board's appraisal of the merit
of the employees' complaint.""8 The issue was also irrelevant to the
question of whether employees are engaging in protected concerted
activity.86 Alleluia Cushion, a watershed case, was perhaps most no-
table for reducing the standards for protecting individual safety pro-
tests under section 7 to near minimum. Eventually, the Board would
retreat from this position. In the meantime, Alleluia Cushion like
Interboro before it, met with resistance in the courts.
Though not reviewed directly by a court of appeals,8 7 the identi-
cal issue was renewed - and rejected - in cases decided by the
80. Id. at 1000.
81. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 79.
83. See supra notes 43 and 65.
84. Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000. The language with respect to the reasona-
bleness of the safety complaint, adopted in Washington Aluminum and Interboro was conspic-
uously absent in this case. This absence should not suggest a rejection of this proposition, see
supra note 43, but rather a conclusion that the safety hazards at the workplace in question
were beyond doubt; the petitioning employee was merely seeking the employer's compliance
with health and safety standards with which he was under a legal duty to comply.
85. Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298 n.7.
86. Id at 1298.
87. 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 141 (2d ed. 1983).
Fourth,88 Fifth,8 9, Eighth,90 and Ninth Circuits.91 Yet in the face of
significant judicial opposition, the Board did not waiver from its
original position. On the contrary, the years following Alleluia
Cushion witnessed the expansion of section 7 protection to individual
complaints made to the Federal Wage and Hour Division, 2 the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, 3 the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ties Commission, 4 and various workers compensation boards. 5 In
addition, the ruling was expanded to a wider range of protected self-
help mechanisms.98
III. The Rise of OSHA Protection for Refusals to do Hazardous
Work
A. Section 11(c) Protection
The adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
1970 (OSHA)9 7 reflected the trend toward expansion of protected
individual employee safety protests. Precipitated in large part by the
recognition among both the working class and remaining public at
large 8 that state regulation of safety and health standards was inad-
equate, the Act was intended to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions."'9 To effectuate this purpose Congress placed a general
duty upon each employer to maintain a safe workplace.' 00 It dele-
gated enforcement power to the Secretary of Labor. Specifically, the
88. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980) (expressed
intent to file workmen's compensation claim rather than follow company plan for reimburse-
ment held not concerted activity within the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA).
89. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977) (employee seeking
to redress violation of rights granted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refus-
ing to operate machine).
91. NLRB v. C&I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973) (employee
refusing to carry furnaces up stairway which had recently collapsed injuring a co-worker).
92. Triangle Tool & Engineering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1976).
93. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 58 (1982).
94. Service Spring Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 812 (1982).
95. Ohio Brass Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 137 (1982).
96. See infra note 133.
97. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (1975).
98. See Merrick and Quinn, The Working Conditions Survey as a Source of Social
Indication, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16 (Apr. 1971). The study found that "the labor stan-
dards areas that were most important to workers were those relating principally to the general
area of health and safety and, secondarily, to the general area of income." Id. at 21.
For a good discussion of the public concern precipitating the OSHA legislation. See Bur-
ton, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Introduction, 23 LAB. L.J. 501, 502-04 (1972).
99. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §651(b).
100. Id. §654. This section states in pertinent part:
(a) Each employer -
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of em-
ployment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees;(2) shall comply with
occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter.
Act required the Secretary to promulgate safety standards and to
insure the maintenance of these standards through regular on-site
inspections. 10'
Because the problem of occupational safety was endemic to vir-
tually every industrial work environment, 102 Congress contemplated
the use of employees as a necessary arm of OSHA enforcement. This
philosophy became apparent in the participation of employees in the
administration of the Act on almost every level; employees were to
play a vital function in the promulgation of safety standards,' the
assessment of employer compliance with these standards,0 and per-
haps most importantly, the petitioning of the Secretary for inspec-
tion of a suspect workplace.' 05
The employees' watch-dog capacity in the administration of
OSHA was, however, subject to the same risk of employer retalia-
tion which the courts confronted in interpreting section 7 protection
for safety protests. Therefore, OSHA attempted to eliminate such
trepidation through section 11(c) which forbids discharge or actions
against employees who institute complaints against their employer or
take any action in furtherance of the statutory purpose of the Act.0 6
However, the extent of employee activity protected by section 11(c)
was not set out. Courts have held the phrase "under or related to the
Act"' 0 7 to include employee actions such as informing his employer
101. Id. §§655, 657.
102. See supra note 98.
103. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(1).
104. Id. at §655(b)(7).
105. Id. at §657(f)(1). This Section states in pertinent part:
Any employees or representative of employees who believe that a violation of a
safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an immi-
nent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary
or his authorized representative of such violation or danger.
106. Id. at §660(c)(1). This Section states in full:(1) No person shall discharge or in
any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such em-
ployee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.(2) Any employee
who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in
violation of this subsection may, within thirty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint
with the Secretary alleging such discrimination. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Secretary
shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriate. If upon such investigation,
the Secretary determines that the provisions of this subsection have been violated, he shall
bring an action in any appropriate United States district court against such person. In any
such action the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain
violations of paragraph (1) of this subsection and order all appropriate relief including rehiring
or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay.(3) Within 90 days of
the receipt of a complaint filed under this subsection the Secretary shall notify the complain-
ant of his determination under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
For a good discussion of § 11 (c) and its impact upon individual safety protests, see Comment,
A Right Under OSHA to Refuse Unsafe Work or a Hobson's Choice of Safety or Job?, 8 U.
BALT. L. REV. 519, 521-43 (1979).
107. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(t).
about potential safety violations, 108 retaining counsel to challenge
unsafe workplaces, 10 9 and temporary walkouts to notify OSHA of
safety violations. 110 Significantly, by its terms the protective ambit of
section 11(c) was not extended to outright refusals to do hazardous
work.
In 1973, the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to his rulemaking au-
thority,"" issued an interpretive regulation which defined section
11 (c) to protect, under certain circumstances, such an extreme form
of employee self-help in the face of dangerous working conditions.
The regulation states in part:
[A]s a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act
which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of
potential unsafe conditions at the workplace...
However, occasions might arise when an employee is con-
fronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or
subjecting himself to serious injury or death arising from a haz-
ardous condition at the workplace. If the employee, with no rea-
sonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the
dangerous condition, he would be protected against subsequent
discrimination.11
2
Even this narrow interpretation of section 1 1(c) based primarily
upon the Secretary's analysis of its legislative history, was not uni-
formly accepted by the courts. The Fifth Circuit found no such im-
plied right within the Act.' To the contrary, the Sixth Circuit, de-
claring itself "in full agreement"" 4 with the dissent in the Fifth
Circuit, upheld the right of an employee to refuse to work in the face
of present danger." 5 Faced with a conflict among the circuits, the
108. Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
109. Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
110. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979), aftd, 445 U.S. 1
(1980).
111. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §657(g)(2).
112. 29 C.F.R. §1977.12(b)(1)-(2) (1980).
113. Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 880 (1978). This case arose after an employer discharged a construction worker who
refused to continue working upon a 150 foot high steel beam in high winds. The court based its
rejection of the Secretary of Labor's interpretive regulation upon a review of the legislative
history of the Act. First, the court drew on Congress' rejection of "strike with pay" provisions
which would have allowed employees to absent themselves from the job with pay when exposed
to potentially harmful work environments. Id. at 712. Second, the court noted that the Act
only empowered the Secretary to seek a court-ordered injunction rather than to shutdown an
employer's facility on his own authority. According to the court, the refusal to grant the Secre-
tary the power of summary action stemmed from Congress' fear that this authority might
allow workers to unduly influence OSHA inspectors who might issue administrative orders
restraining an employer's business operations too readily. Id. at 714. For a good discussion of
the historical enactment of OSHA, see Gross, The Occupational Safety and Health Act:
Much Ado About Something, 3 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 249-51 (1972).
114. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 736 (6th Cir. 1979), affid, 445 U.S. 1
(1980).
115. Id.
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Marshall v.
Whirlpool Corp.11
B. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.
In Whirlpool,117 the Supreme Court affirmed the Secretary of
Labor's interpretive regulation as a "permissable gloss on the Act, in
light of the Act's language, structure and legislative history.1"8 The
case confronted the court with a classic example of an employee's
refusal to do hazardous work. Two employees of the Whirlpool Cor-
poration, claimed that a suspended wire-mesh screen designed to
protect workers from debris falling from an overhead conveyor belt
was unsafe,"1 9 and they refused to comply with their foreman's order
to begin a maintenance operation on the screen. A co-worker had
died after attempting the same operation one week earlier.12 0 Upon
their refusal to carry out the foreman's directive, the two employees
were ordered to halt work and leave the facility without pay for the
remainder of this shift. Shortly thereafter they received written rep-
rimands which were placed in their permanent work files.
The court interpreted the general duty clause of the Act liber-
ally. 21 It found the right to refuse hazardous work implied in the
duty of each employer to provide a safe workplace for his employees.
However, at the same time, the Court placed limitations upon this
protected right by making it contingent upon the following two
factors:
(1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work under con-
116. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 5-8. The employer's manufacturing plant utilized overhead conveyor belts to
transport appliance components throughout the plant. To protect employees from debris falling
from the conveyor belt, the company installed a wire-mesh screen approximately 20 feet from
the floor of the plant. Maintenance employees were periodically directed to clear the debris
and grease accumulations off the screen. This procedure was usually performed by mainte-
nance employees standing on the iron beams which supported the screen; however, in this case
the maintenance required the workers to stand on the screen itself.
120. Id. at 5-6. Following this incident, the company began repair of the screen, install-
ing new, stronger screens. The company also issued an order strictly forbidding maintenance
employees from stepping on the screen. This was effectuated by the development of an alterna-
tive cleaning method which required employees to stand on power raised mobile platforms and
use hooks to recover the debris. Thus the foreman's directive was in clear contravention of the
revised company policy.
121. Id. at 12-13. The Court stated:
[Tlhe Secretary's regulation can be viewed as an appropriate aid to the full
effectuation of the Act's 'general duty' clause ...As the legislative history of
this provision reflects, it was intended itself to deter the occurrence of occupa-
tional deaths and serious injuries by placing on employers a mandatory obliga-
tion independent of the specific health and safety standards to be promulgated
by the Secretary. Since OSHA inspectors cannot be present around the clock in
every workplace, the Secretary's regulation ensures that employees will in all
circumstances enjoy the rights afforded them by the 'general duty' clause.
ditions that the employee reasonably believes pose an imminent
risk of death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee has
reason to believe that there is not sufficient time or opportunity
either to seek effective redress from his employer or to apprise
OSHA of the danger.122
These prerequisites 128 for a protected safety protest reflected the
Court's view that, for the vast majority of these protests, the Act
provided a sufficient remedy without resorting to absolute refusal to
continue work.1 ' Though technically Whirlpool stood for the pro-
position that a refusal to do hazardous work was protected from em-
ployer retaliation under section 11(c), the Court's limited view of
this right has come to overshadow the proposition itself.
IV. The Demise of NLRA Protection
In Alleluia Cushion and Whirlpool, the rights of the individual,
nonunionized worker to refuse unsafe work reached its zenith. Both
section 7 of the NLRA and section 11(c) of OSHA had become
stretched beyond their precise language to protect even the most ex-
treme form of self-help in response to hazardous work conditions.
The rise of individual protection for safety protests was, however, cut
back by two separate actions taken by the NLRB in subsequent
years.
A. The Memorandum of Understanding
In 1975, the General Counsel of the NLRB125 and the U.S. De-
partment of Labor entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
which defined the boundaries of authority between the two agencies
with respect to safety protests. The Memorandum cited the need to
"obviate duplicate litigation' 26 and "insure that employees' rights in
the area of safety and health" remain "protected."' 27 Noting that
"employee safety activities may be protected under both Acts"' 28 the
Memorandum resolved the overlap in favor of OSHA jurisdiction
122. Id. at 11.
123. See infra notes 157-162 and accompany text.
124. Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at II.
125. See supra note 59.
126. Memorandum of Understanding, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,083 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum]. Citing §8(a)(l) of NLRA, the Memorandum states in pertinent part: Al-
though there may be some safety and health activities which may be protected solely under the
OSH Act, it appears that many employee safety activities may be protected under both Acts.
However, since an employee's right to engage in safety and health activity is specifically pro-
tected by the OSH Act and is only generally included in the broader right to engage in con-
certed activities under the NLRA, it is appropriate that enforcement actions to protect such





The procedural agreement 129 reached in the Memorandum con-
templated four distinct situations in which the General Counsel
might remove the claim to the Department of Labor under section
1 1(c) of OSHA. 130 In three of these four situations, the General
Counsel agreed to dismiss or defer the section 8 NLRA complaint to
his OSHA counterpart. 13 1 Though the thrust of the Memorandum
appeared to abdicate the protected rights of employees developed in
the continuum of cases from Washington Aluminum through Alle-
luia Cushion, the impact of the Memorandum remains unclear.
The Memorandum has had little statistical impact upon the
number of safety related Section 8 NLRA claims, as they have
steadily increased following its issuance in 1975.132 Indeed, the mere
fact that the circuit courts have entertained Alleluia-type cases
brought on appeal from NLRB decisions is a clear indication that
the Memorandum has not effectuated its intended goal.33 It has
even been theorized that the Memorandum, by abdicating NLRB
jurisdiction over safety related labor disputes, exceeded the statutory
mandate of the NLRA. 34 These factors, suggesting the impotency
129. Id. at 26,084.
130. Id. The four categories of safety claims defined in the Memorandum are as follows:
(1) the claimant files a claim both under the NLRA and OSHA. The General Counsel then
dismisses or defers the complaint to OSHA and informs both the charging party and the
claimant of its action; (2) the claimant files under NLRA but not OSHA. The General Coun-
sel then notifies the claimant to file an 11(c) complaint with OSHA within 30 days. If the
claimant files a timely complaint, the General Counsel will defer or dismiss the §8(a)(l)
NLRA complaint; (3) the claimant, under the same circumstances found in the second cate-
gory, chooses not to file an 11 (c) complaint. The General Counsel then processes the complaint
under the NLRA; (4) the complaint defines issues covered under 11(c) as well as matters
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Counsel. The Office of the Solicitor of Labor
and the General Counsel will "consult in order to determine the appropriate handling of the
matter."
131. Id.
132. Report on ALJ Shortage, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 213 (1983). The report notes:
"The GAO reported that the overall number of unfair labor practice charges filed with the
agency [referring to the NLRA] rose by about 49 percent between fiscal years 1974 and
1979." See also Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor
Statistics 1978 (Bulletin No. 2000, 1979). In 1974, there were 111 work stoppages leading to
claims; this number comprised 1.8 percent of the total number of work stoppages. In 1975, this
figure rose to 152 comprising 3.0 percent of the total. In 1976, the number rose to 165 com-
prising 2.9 percent of the total. Id. at 525-27.
133. See, e.g., Michigan Metal Processing Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 275 (1982) (employees
fired for filing OSHA complaint); Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1982) (safety
complaints found concerted as part of organizational campaign); P&L Cedar Products, Inc.,
224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1976) (employee presenting safety violations to shop steward). See also
Newport News Ship Building & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1387 (1978); Sargent Electrical
Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1978).
134. 29 U.S.C. §153(d) vests the General Counsel with "final authority" to issue unfair
labor practice complaints. Courts have held that such prosecutorial discretion divests the fed-
eral courts of review over these decisions. However, it has also been argued that this absolute
decision-making authority runs counter to both the congressional intent of the NLRA to make
the Board the policy-making body under the NLRA as well as to the basic concept of judicial
review over executive agency action. See generally Note, Judicial Reviewability of NLRB
Rulings, 63 Nw. L. REV. 106 (1968); Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretior Fail-
of the Memorandum, have perhaps become moot in light of the
NLRB's recent decision in Myers Industries Inc.,135 for the decision
in Myers Industries has effectively put an end to section 7 protection
of individual safety protest in a nonunionized workplace.
B. Implications of Myers Industries
The Board in Myers Industries'3 9 was confronted with an em-
ployee dismissal similar to those found in Alleluia Cushion and its
progeny. An empl6yee was ordered to continue driving a company
truck and trailer with malfunctioning brakes which had earlier
caused an accident.1 3 7 Rather than obey the company directive, the
employee contacted the state public service commission, which in-
spected the vehicle and issued a citation."8' Upon returning to the
employer's home office, the employee was terminated because, in the
employer's words, "we cannot have you calling the cops like this all
the time.' 39 The employee was not represented by a union.
In deciding the case the Board announced its departure from
precedent. Specifically, the Board concluded that the Alleluia Cush-
ion standard of "constructive" concerted activity did "not comport
with principles inherent in Section 7."'" The Board reached this
point after making a four-part study of its decisions both before and
after Alleluia Cushion. First, focusing on the pre-Alleluia Cushion
decisions, the Board found strong language both from the Board and
from the courts supporting the concept of group action as a prerequi-
site of protected concerted activity. 4 ' Second, it portrayed its own
post-Alleluia Cushion decisions as "ad hoc" meaning that rather
than confining its interpretation of concerted activity to construction
of the Act, it had begun to base its decisions on its own formulation
of "public policy". 142 Third, contrary to the legislative history of the
NLRA, Alleluia Cushion had shifted the burden of proof from the
General Counsel to the employer to prove the absence of concerted
activity by showing that his employees actually disavowed the ac-
ure to Prosecute, 75 COLtJM. L. REV. 130 (1975); Mahinka, The Problem of
Nonreviewability: Judicial Control of Action Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 25-35 (1974); McClintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel - Par-
tial Enforcement of the Labor Act, 12 GONz. L. REV. 79, 103-15 (1976).
135. 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1984 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,019.
136. Id.
137. Id. The employer also had been notified of steering problems with the same vehicle
which had nearly caused an accident some time earlier.
138. Id. One month after the previous citation, the complaining employee had been in-
volved in an accident in the same vehicle. At that time his employer told him to get the vehicle
home as best he could.
139. Id. at 27,295.
140. Id. at 27,294.
141. Id. at 27,291. See supra notes 67-70.
142. Id at 27,293.
tions of the individual protester."43 Fourth, a majority of the courts
of appeals reviewing the postAlleluia Cushion cases had "rejected
the per se standard of concerted activity.' 144 For these reasons, the
Board rescinded the protection previously afforded individual, nonu-
nionized employees protesting safety hazards in the workplace.
V. Ramifications of Myers Industries Upon the Individual Safety
Protest
Prior to Myers Industries, an employee's safety protest in a fed-
eral circuit which had not explicitly rejected Alleluia Cushion could
invoke protection under section 7 of the NLRA. Assuming the com-
plaint was found meritorious, upon investigation the General Coun-
sel would have pursued a section 8(a)(1) claim ultimately to the fed-
eral court of appeals seeking an injunction and/or reinstatement
with back pay. After Myers Industries, however, the General Coun-
sel will dismiss the case of an isolated employee safety protest. Be-
cause this decision is not reviewable by any court, 1 5 the employee
will necessarily be unable to seek NLRA protection from employer
retaliation. His sole avenue of redress will be through the filing of an
11(c) complaint under OSHA. The practical consequences of the
NLRB's removal of individual safety protests from the protection
granted concerted activities can be appreciated by comparing the
safeguards and procedures of section 11(c) with those previously af-
forded under section 7 of the NLRA.
A. Practical Ramifications
The most fundamental distinction between filing an 11(c) com-
plaint and filing one under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA is the stat-
ute of limitations allotted for each complaint. Under the NLRA, an
employee has six months from the time of the alleged unfair labor
practice to file a complaint with the Regional Office." ' Under
OSHA, the statute of limitations for filing an I I(c) complaint is
thirty days."" This stark difference highlights perhaps the most dev-
astating consequence of the Myers Industries decision. There is a
danger that unwary nonunion employees with individual safety pro-
tests may continue to file under the NLRA, at the same rate as un-
ionized employees, may lose valuable time, and may find themselves
outside the limitations period. Indeed, the steady growth of section
143. Id.
144. Id. Specifically, the Board cited: Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1980); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977).
145. See supra note 134.
146. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1973).
147. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(2) (1975).
8(a)(1) safety-related complaints following the issuance of the Mem-
orandum,'14 8 may indicate that such a wholesale shift to OSHA
11 (c) filing will not take place. 149 In the long term, the thirty day
statute of limitations under 11(c) may be the single greatest deter-
rent to the protection of individual refusals to do hazardous work in
the nonunion workplace.
The preclusion of such complaints by the NLRB is exacerbated
by recent Reagan Administration policy which has effected a reduc-
tion in OSHA enforcement at almost every level. A recent survey
conducted by the AFL-CIO 150 shows a 65 percent decline in the
number of 11 (c) complaints from the first twelve months of the Rea-
gan Administration."" Furthermore, the number of inspections un-
dertaken pursuant to the filing of a complaint declined by 58 percent
during the same period. 52 This latter decline is significant because
the filing of a successful 11 (c) complaint will normally be predicated
upon the report of an on-site inspection of an employer's facility.153
Finally, the study cites a significant decline in the number of overall
inspections, citations issued, and penalties levied. 54 It is possible that
his decline in OSHA enforcement levels will stimulate employer in-
sensitivity to individual safety protests. Thus, even though the courts
have continually reaffirmed the Whirlpool decision and the protec-
tion accorded individual safety protests under Section 11(c), as a
practical matter the short limitations period may hamper the full
realization of such protection.
B. Theoretical Ramifications
The standards developed by the Whirlpool court for triggering
section 11 (c) protection restrict workers' self-help in safety disputes
in a manner not found in the NLRA cases before Myers Industries.
148. See supra note 126.
149. 9 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1013 (Mar. 27, 1980). The report on OSHA inspection
activity from 1973 to 1979 noted that nationwide less than two percent of all establishments
with ten or fewer employees were inspected by Federal or State OSHA inspectors. The total
number of inspections per year over the same time period was lower for establishments with
11-25 employees than those with 26-49 employees.
150. AFL-CIO Tables on Enforcement Activity by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 12 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 454-55 (Nov. 4, 1982).
151. Id. The monthly average dropped from 230 11 (c) complaints from January 1980 to
October 1980 to 150 complaints from February 1981 to September 1981 and again down to 81
complaints per month from October 1981 to June 1982.
152. Id. The monthly average dropped from 1419 complaint inspections from January
1980 to October 1980 to 1027 from February 1981 to September 1981 and again down to 596
complaint inspections per month from October 1981 to June 1982.
153. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 150. But see 12 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 27 (June 10, 1982). (Assistant
Labor Secretary claimed that AFL-CIO Safety and Health Director had used the raw data
obtained from OSHA "incorrectly" in the federation's publications and newsletters "to demon-
strate that this Administration is less than active on safety and health fronts; a position that
cannot be demonstrated through any means other than misuse of incomplete data."
The trilogy of cases culminating in Alleluia Cushion had accepted
the proposition that the merit of an employee safety complaint had
no bearing upon the determination of an existing unfair labor prac-
tice. 155 The court also considered the degree of the danger perceived
by the employee to be irrelevant. The sole prerequisites for the estab-
lishment of a prima facie section 8(a)(1) violation were that the
worker make a safety protest in good faith and that the complaint
caused the employer's retaliatory action;1"8 thus, section 8(a)(1)
could protect safety protests in which the danger was neither imme-
diate nor grevious.
By contrast, the Court in Whirlpool narrowed section 11(c) to
encompass only those safety protests which were "reasonable" in
light of the totality of circumstances.15 7 Whirlpool further distin-
guished section 11(c) protection from that afforded by section
8(a)(1) by requiring that the perceived danger pose "an imminent
risk of death or serious bodily injury. 1 58 Although the Court did not
expand upon these two criteria, a few lower court decisions in this
area have hammered out their meaning.
A survey of these cases shows the harsh consequences which the
Whirlpool limitations have upon the protection of individual safety
protests. In Marshall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'59 and Mar-
shall v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,160 the courts demonstrated tight rein
on the concept of "reasonableness" and "imminent danger of serious
injury or death". The Firestone Tire Court found the employee's
safety protest protected only upon concluding that the conditions
which he confronted were "of such a nature that a reasonable per-
son, under the circumstances then confronting [the petitioner] would
conclude that there was a real danger of death or serious injury."16
In N.L. Industries, the Seventh Circuit granted section 11 (c) protec-
tion only after a showing by the Secretary of Labor that conditions
similar to those the discharged employee faced at the time of his
work refusal, had earlier resulted in a life-threatening accident."6 2
155. See supra notes 43 and 65.
156. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962).
157. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
158. Id.
159. 8 O.S.H. CAs. (BNA) 1637 (C.D. I11. 1980).
160. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
161. Marshall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 8 O.S.H. CAs. (BNA) at 1638. The
court found that the catwalk upon which the employee was ordered to work was covered with
snow; the temperature was just below freezing with a wind of at least 10 mph.; the lighting
was "so poor that the employees used flashlights and had to hold them in their teeth in order
to see."
162. N.L. Industries, 618 F.2d at 1222. The employee was assigned to load lead scrap
into a melting kettle at defendant's workplace using a payloader without a windshield or en-
closed cab. While performing this operation he observed the dross in the kettle separating from
the side of the pot. Similar conditions one week earlier had resulted in an explosion from which
the employee had escaped injury only because the payloader was equipped with a windshield
The two cases illustrate the type of burden the employee faces in
pursuing an 11 (c) complaint: he must show either egregious circum-
stances or a prior accident under similar conditions.
In Whirlpool, the Supreme Court articulated removing section
11 (c) protection in situations where there is enough time to alleviate
the hazardous condition without resorting to a work stoppage.' The
commentators have uniformly interpreted this limitation as allowing
the OSHA protection in two distinct settings: (1) where the em-
ployee notifies his employer of the hazardous condition and is unable
to obtain a correction of the condition; (2) where there is insufficient
time to eliminate the danger by resorting to regular enforcement
channels. 16"
One case which highlights the limitation which these two crite-
ria place upon section 11(c) protection is Marshall v. National In-
dustrial Contractors, Inc.'65 There, the court found that the Secre-
tary had failed to prove a retaliatory discharge because there was no
evidence that the discharged employees made any complaints to
their employee prior to discharge.166 Interestingly, it is precisely this
analysis which the United States Supreme Court rejected in Wash-
ington Aluminum. 6 '
VI. Conclusion
The Myers Industries decision has effectively removed the pro-
spective protection of employee safety protests developed in the
Washington Aluminum - Interboro - Alleluia Cushion trilogy. Cou-
pled with the narrow ambit of section 11(c), the result has left the
individual employee who perceives potential safety hazards in the
workplace without an effective shield against employer retaliation.
Thus, the individual employee is placed in the precarious position of
determining under what conditions and at what time the Whirlpool
criteria has been met. Any miscalculation by the employee will re-
sult in the scenario which section 11(c) was designed to prevent: a
worker facing the dilemma of probable discharge or continued work
under unsafe conditions. The impotence of section 11 (c) protection is
evidenced by the small number of 11 (c) complaints filed in the years
following the broadening of 1 1 (c) under the Secretary's interpretive
and enclosed cab.
163. Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at 11.
164. See Note, Imminent Danger - Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 - An
Employee May Choose Not to Perform His Assigned Task Because of a Reasonable Appre-
hension of Death or Serious Injury Couple with a Reasonable Belief that No Less Drastic
Alternative is Available, 7 No. Ky. L. REV. 217 (1980); Comment, supra note 106, at 526.
165. 8 O.S.H. CAS. (BNA) 1117 (D. Neb. 1980).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
regulation; 68 a fact which has led one commentator to conclude that
"it is extremely doubtful that its [section 11(c)] narrow provision
will cause a significant increase among employees to refuse to per-
form work due to job safety hazards in the post-Whirlpool era."
1 69
The Board's rejection of Alleluia Cushion and the protection it
accorded individual safety protests in a nonunionized workplace
highlights the intransigence of both the federal government and fed-
eral judiciary toward protecting this class of workers. In this respect,
the Myers Industries decision merely represents an affirmation of
the procedural formula outlined in the Memorandum of Understand-
ing as well as the view held by the majority of federal courts review-
ing Alleluia Cushion. More importantly, this decision portrays a
clear redrafting of the battle lines between those demanding limited
statutory protection of safety disputes and those seeking a broader
protective ambit for such protests. Though this battle has claimed
NLRA section 7 protection of individual safety protests as its most
recent victim, this victory may only be Pyrrhic. The fundamental
premise of Washington Aluminum upon which the protection of
safety disputes was originally founded - that unsafe working condi-
tions could not "be tolerated in a humane and civilized society like
ours"' 1 7 - remains to this day unchallenged.
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